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11. Introduction
Long run convergence of GDP per capita levels has been a subject of study in many of the recent
and not so recent work on economic growth. One strand of literature, based on the work of
Gerschenkron (1962), argues that international diffusion of technology is a major source of
convergence in the long run. The argument here is that GDP per capita can be considered as an,
admittedly crude, indicator of productivity, and hence as an indirect indicator of the average
technological level of a country. Those countries with a relatively low GDP per capita may exploit
the backlog of knowledge applied in the technologically leading nations, under the condition that
they have adequate ‘social capability’ and that a minimum level of ‘technological congruence’
exists between the leaders and followers (Abramovitz, 1986, Fagerberg, 1994).
A different theoretical explanation for long run convergence in GDP per capita comes out of
the traditional neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956, Solow, 1970). In this framework,
convergence occurs because all countries are assumed to behave according to an identical
production function and can use the same (exogenous) technological knowledge. The neoclassical
model based on these assumptions predicts that all countries will converge to a steady state
growth path (determined only by population growth and the growth of exogenous technology).
The economic mechanism that ensures this convergence is the declining marginal productivity of
capital, which gives relatively backward (in terms of the capital labour ratio) countries a growth
bonus over the more advanced countries.
In almost all of the empirical studies in these traditions, GDP (or GNP) is used as the basic
indicator of economic growth. Williamson (1995) questioned this indicator, and argued that
‘factor prices generally, and real wages specifically, are the better yardstick for assessing sources
of long run convergence’ (p. 142). The reasons for this are fourfold  (Williamson, 1995, p. 142-
3). First, Williamson’s interest seems to be in marginal productivity of production factors, and
average labour productivity is not a good indicator for this. Note that, given the distinction
between different theoretical approaches to convergence (as outlined above), the focus on
marginal productivity is typically associated with the neo-classical growth model (or, in fact, with
trade theory, as will be outlined below). Second, the deflators for GDP and wages differ, and
Williamson considers the one for wages more relevant for measuring ‘convergence’. Third,
international and intertemporal differences in labour participation rates cause a difference between
per capita and per employee (per hour) measures, where the per employee (or per hour) measure
is a better indicator of (average) productivity.
Williamson’s reasoning in terms of marginal productivity and factor prices thus seems to be
biased towards a neo-classical interpretation of growth. In the ‘old’ neoclassical growth model
(Solow), the marginal product of labour depends on the exogenous state of technology as well
as the capital labour ratio. In the long run, a country is predicted to converge to a fixed steady
state capital labour ratio, which depends on the savings rate. Convergence in this model is thus
conditional on the savings rate (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  If convergence takes place
 In order to prove factor price equalization from the model’s assumptions, it is necessary to1
assume that ‘factor intensity reversals’ do not occur (see, e.g. Leamer (1984), chapter 1).
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(e.g., when savings rates are equal across countries), this implies convergence in term of GDP per
capita as well as in terms of (real) wages. It would thus not make a large difference whether one
would test in terms of marginal productivity (or wages) or average productivity. However, the
wage side of the issue is not often tested (Dollar and Wolff, 1993, is a notable exception).
However, a different perspctive on the issue is provided by the theory of international trade.
In the traditional (static) trade theory (HOS), factor price equalization results from international
trade under the assumption that production technologies are the same across countries, but factor
endowments differ.  The HOS model, however, does not have the same implications as the Solow1
growth model for convergence of productivity (see Dollar and Wolff, 1993, pp 47ff for a more
elaborate treatment). In the HOS model, factor price equalization resulting from international
trade leads to equal levels of labour productivity on an industry-by-industry base, but not
necessarily so at the aggregate level. The reason for a lack of convergence at the aggregate level
lies in the fact that different countries may be characterized by different sectoral shares in
production, and each sector has its own capital labour ratio. The different sectoral shares in
production result from trade specialization, which in turn is a function of factor endowments
(capital labour ratio). Thus, where the Solow growth model predicts convergence in labour
productivity and wages at (approximately) the same rate, the HOS trade theory predicts complete
convergence in wages, but incomplete convergence of labour productivity at the macro level.
Williamson’s (1995: 143) assessment that “wage convergence is likely to be far more dramatic
than GNP per worker convergence” seems to be rooted in this ‘trade approach’ to convergence.
The, often less formal, approaches in the field of economic history, institutional economics,
cliometrics or ‘technology gap’ theories, in general do not arrive at such a clear-cut relation
between convergence in wages and productivity. In the tradition of rather complex and multi-
causal interpretations of all these frameworks, a multitude of factors would be considered to have
an impact on wage formation. Although, as stressed by Williamson, work on the relation between
growth and labour markets is relatively underdeveloped in these theoretical frameworks, there is
no reason to expect a priori that a strong correspondence between convergence in GDP per capita
and real wage rates will result.
Concluding, a comparison between convergence in GDP per capita and real wages is an
interesting issue. From a neo-classical point of view, one may distinguish between two
perdictions: the ‘trade based prediction’ argues that real wages converge more rapidly than GDP
per capita, while the growth theory predicts no difference in the speed of convergence between
the two. However, despite Williamson’s implicit comparisons of his own results to the empirical
results based on GDP per capita, he fails to compare the two indicators explicitly. It is the aim of
this paper to fill this gap by systematically comparing the data on GDP per capita from Maddison
(1995) and those on real wage rates from Williamson (1995). In doing so, the ‘stylized facts’ that
 Williamson’s Table A2.1 (International real wages) contains data for more years than in Table2
A1.1, despite the fact that Table A2.1 has been calculated on the basis of Table A1.1. We therefore
calculated the data for those missing years from Table A2.1.
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a theory on convergence of GDP per capita and real wage rates will have to explain will be
outlined, and some comments upon the usefulness of the above mentioned theories in light of the
comparison carried out will be made. Also, some ad hoc speculations about the observed trends
in the data will be provided.
2. A comparison of trends in real wages and GDP per capita
In comparing the data on real wages from Williamson to the GDP per capita data from Maddison,
one has to keep in mind the methodological differences between the two data sets. Maddison’s
data are based on national accounts definitions, and include all economic activities defined in this
framework. As such, the GDP per capita data by Maddison (as used in this paper) refer to a
constant set of economic activities for the complete period which is covered. Obviously, the
quality of the GDP data vary with the periods and country for which they are estimated.
Williamson’s data, on the other hand, refer to a specific group of workers (“typically urban
unskilled”, p. 142) only, and this sample, in many cases, does not seem to be representative for
labour income as a whole, let alone income from non-labour sources. Moreover, the sample of
workers to which the wage data by Williamson refers, differs over time (e.g., after 1950,
Williamson uses primarily wages in manufacturing from ILO and OECD sources, before 1950 the
sample is considerably smaller in many cases), and no attempt seems to have been made to correct
the data for this. Also, changes in social security benefits or payments are not taken into account
when constructing the data, nor is the impact of overtime and bonuses (i.e., Williamson’s data are
pure wages rather than total earnings). The Williamson wage data can thus only be seen as a very
crude approximation of trends in labour income.
Given this background to the data, the relation between the growth of GDP per capita and real
wages at the country level is investigated. To this end, Maddison’s data on GDP per capita in
1990 Geary Khamis dollars, were expressed as the level in 1900 = 100. These results are then
compared to the data in Williamson’s Table A1.1 (‘national real wage indices, 1900 = 100’).  The2
results, for 17 countries, are displayed in Figure 1. The graphs contain periods for which a linear
interpolation on the log scale (i.e., a straight line was drawn between the adjacent points in the
graph) was made for missing data (especially for the early GDP data, which is available only for
key years for some countries, and for the periods around the world wars, for which real 
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Figure 1. Long-run movements in wage rates (thin line) and GDP per capita (thick line), value for 1900
=100
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Figure 1. Long-run movements in wage rates (thin line) and GDP per capita (thick line), value for 1900
=100 (continued)
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Figure 1. Long-run movements in wage rates (thin line) and GDP per capita (thick line), value for 1900
=100 (continued)
 Belgium: value for 1939 = 133, no data for 1940-1946, value for 1947 = 86. Brazil: value for3
1937 = 114, no data for 1938 - 1945, value for 1946 = 74. Denmark: value for 1913 = 118, value for
1914 = 62. Germany: value for 1943 = 100, no data for 1944 - 1949, value for 1950 = 78. Portugal:
value for 1912 = 94, no data for 1913 - 1926, value for 1927 = 70.
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wage data are often lacking). It also contains the breaks in the Williamson data.3
The typical pattern in Figure 1 is one in which the lines for real wages and GDP per capita are
close together until they diverge in the period between the two World Wars or directly after
World War II. The two lines stay apart at roughly the same distance in the post-World War II
period until the mid-1970s. From this time on, in many but not all cases wages start to flatten out,
while GDP per capita keeps growing (although at a reduced rate). This causes the gap between
the two lines to increase from the mid-1970s onwards. Such a pattern is found Belgium, Brazil,
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands (where the distance between the two lines is
relatively small), Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Australia. For four of the five countries (all except
Germany) for which there is a break in the wage data series, the divergence between the two lines
occurs exactly at this breakpoint, which makes the exact timing of the divergence as indicated by
the graphs a bit unreliable in these cases.
Of the eleven countries with this standard pattern, there are nine European countries. Among
the six countries for which this ‘standard pattern’ does not hold, there are three European ones.
One might thus argue the ‘standard pattern’ described above is in fact a ‘European pattern’. In
Europe, the countries with a non-standard pattern are Ireland and the United Kingdom, where the
lines for real wages and GDP per capita remain very close together for the complete period, and
Sweden, where the lines are apart until 1900 and move closely together afterwards. Outside
Europe, one finds Argentina, Canada and the United States with ‘non-standard’ patterns. In the
United States, the pattern is reverse to the standard pattern, with the line for wages above the one
for GDP per capita for most of the postwar period. Canada is a mixed case, with wages lagging
behind GDP per capita from 1945 until the mid-1960s, and GDP per capita lagging behind wages
afterwards. With regard to the most recent period, a widening gap is seen between the wage and
GDP per capita lines in Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and
Australia, but not so in the other countries. 
Table 1 provides a slightly different comparison of the trends in wages and GDP per capita. For
four different periods, the table gives average annual growth rates per country. The table confirms
the visual impression from the graphs that the period 1950 - 1973 is the one characterized by most
rapid growth, both in terms of wages and per capita GDP. In the interwar period and the period
after 1977, the differences between the growth of wages and per capita GDP is largest, something
which is again consistent with the earlier interpretation from the graphs. 
Table 1 also gives correlation coefficients between the two growth rates. These results (normal
and rank correlation) indicate that overall, the correlation between wage growth and GDP per
capita growth is not very high, the values of the coefficients are never larger than 0.5, although
they are all positive, as expected. The correlations are relatively low for the period before 1913.
P cpi
P gdp
N
POP
L
N
1
)
,
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Rather than a true indication of little cross-country correlation between wage growth and GDP
per capita growth, this might be the effect of relatively large measurement errors for the data on
the previous century. For 1950 - 1973, the ‘golden age’, the correlation is also somewhat lower
than for the two other periods. 
Table 1. Average Annual compound growth rates of real wages and GDP per capita
1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1988
wages GDP pc wages GDP pc wages GDP pc wages GDP pc
Belgium 1.1 1.0 -0.3 0.7 3.9 3.5 1.2 1.9
Denmark 2.4 1.6 0.4 1.6 4.0 3.1 1.2 1.8
France 0.6 1.5 0.1 1.1 5.2 4.0 2.1 1.8
Germany 1.1 1.6 -0.9 0.3 5.0 5.0 1.8 1.9
Ireland 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.7 3.8 3.1 3.1 2.1
Italy 1.7 1.3 1.1 0.8 3.5 5.0 2.3 2.6
Netherlands 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 3.6 3.4 0.9 1.3
Norway 2.5 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.9 3.2 1.8 3.3
Portugal 0.5 1.2 2.3 5.7 2.1 1.7
Spain 0.0 1.2 -1.5 0.2 3.7 5.8 4.2 1.7
Sweden 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.1 4.1 3.1 0.6 1.7
United Kingdom 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.8 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.9
United States 0.9 1.8 2.8 1.6 1.9 2.4 -0.4 1.7
Canada 1.9 2.2 1.0 1.4 5.0 2.9 0.4 2.5
Australia 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 2.6 2.4 -0.3 1.7
Argentina 0.9 2.5 2.2 0.7 0.6 2.1 -1.3 -0.7
Brazil 1.9 0.3 -0.9 1.9 4.1 3.8 2.3 1.8
Mean 1.3 1.3 0.7 1.1 3.5 3.6 1.4 1.8
Correlation* 0.11 0.43 0.34 0.48
Rank correlation* 0.23 0.45 0.35 0.33
* Correlation between growth rate of real wages and GDP per capita across countries
Source: Williamson (1996, Table A1.1) and calculations on the data from Maddison 
The ratio of the real wage rate (nominal wages deflated by the consumer price index) and real
GDP per capita can be written as
where P  and P  are the price indices for consumer expenditures and GDP, respectively, N iscpi gdp
the labour force, POP is population, L is employment, and ) is the share of wage income in GDP.
Thus, the ratio between the real wage rate and real GDP per capita can be written as the product
 In discrete time, the growth rate of a variable x = ab is equal to the sum of the growth rates of a and b4
plus the product of these two growth rates. The latter is termed the interaction effect, and is usually small (for
obvious reasons). In the present case, the variable to be decomposed is the product of four separate variables, in
which case there are 11 interaction terms. The sum of these is documented in the table under the column
‘interactions’. As can be seen, it is usually small as compared to the other factors.
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of four variables: the ratio of consumer prices and economy-wide prices, the participation rate
(crudely defined as N/POP), the employment rate (L/N, i.e., 1 - the unemployment rate), and the
inverse of labour share in GDP. Any divergence in the ratio of real wages to real GDP per capita
is thus to be explained in terms of these four variables. 
The variables in the above decomposition can in principle be measured in a national accounts
framework. This makes it possible to decompose the divergence or convergence trends between
GDP per capita and wages in Figure 1 into different factors. However, data on all the necessary
variables are only available for the period 1960 - 1988, and for a limited set of 12 countries. For
these countries, data on the two price indices and the share of wage income in GDP was taken
from the OECD national accounts publication, while data on population, the labour force and
unemployment was taken from Maddison (1991).
The decomposition of the growth rate of the ratio of GDP per capita and the wage rate is
documented in Table 2.  The column ‘growth (SNA)’ in Table 2 gives the growth rate of the4
GDP/wage ratio as calculated from the national accounts data (Maddison and OECD). The
column ‘growth’ gives the growth of the ratio as observed by comparing the Maddison and
Williamson data (Figure 1). The table shows that there are indeed large differences between the
two methods (column ‘discrepancy’). These must be attributed to differences between
Williamson’s methodology and the SNA framework used in Table 2 (and by Maddison’s GDP
data).
Thus, for example, the data on wages in the SNA framework (OECD) are for all labour in the
economy, whereas Williamson’s data refer only to a limited sample of labour. Also, the price
indices used to deflate wages may be different (the implicit consumer price index from the OECD
national accounts in Table 2, whereas Williamson does not document his deflators). 
Nevertheless, there is a positive correlation between the ‘growth’ and ‘growth (SNA)’ columns
in Table 2: 0.45 and 0.54 for 1960-73 and 1973-88, respectively. This indicates that although the
absolute magnitude of the growth rate differential between Maddison’s GDP per capita and
Williamson’s real wage is not very well explained by the calculations in Table 2, the cross-country
variation is, to a certain degree, explained.
With regard to the underlying factors for the differential trends in wages and GDP per capita,
Table 2 points out that there are quite different factors at work for different periods. For 1960-
1973, both the ‘growth’ and ‘growth (SNA)’ columns find that wages grow more rapidly than
GDP per capita. The main two factors driving this are an increase in wages as a share of GDP
(i.e., wages growing rapidly), and a price effect (i.e., the consumer price index grows relatively
10
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 slow as compared to other components of GDP). The main factor that works for equalization
(i.e., ‘bringing GDP per capita growth closer to wage rate growth’) is an increase in the
participation rate.
In the 1973-1988 period, on the other hand, GDP per capita grows more rapidly than wages.
The participation rate, which continues to rise, is the main explanation behind this trend. Rising
unemployment is the main factor that works against the tendency for GDP per capita to grow
more rapidly than wages in this period.
For earlier periods, the data on prices and the wage bill from the OECD national accounts are
lacking. Maddison (1991), however, does provide data on unemployment and the participation
rate. For the large majority of countries in the analysis here, the unemployment rate rose
substantially over the period 1920 - 1938, and especially so over the 1930s (obviously). The
participation rate, on average, increased somewhat during 1913 - 1938, but fell in most countries
during 1938 - 1950. In the interwar period, one thus sees increasing unemployment, and
increasing participation rates. The latter trend induces a more equal development between wages
and GDP per capita, whereas the former causes GDP per capita to grow relatively slow as
compared to the wage rate. Judging from the data in Figure 1, the latter effect has been
dominating in the interwar period. One might also expect, however, that an indirect labour market
effect of the unemployment rate on wages was strong during this period. 
3. Convergence of real wage levels and GDP per capita
For the debate on convergence, the pure growth rates of real wages and GDP per capita are not
so interesting. Some idea of the level differences between countries is necessary to assess whether
or not convergence has taken place. As Maddison and other authors do for GDP, Williamson
provides such level comparisons in the form of benchmarks for individual years. Williamson
chooses to estimate benchmarks for several years. Although one may argue that more than one
benchmark increases accuracy, this method has the disadvantage that it creates breaks in the time
series (at points where one switches from one benchmark to the other).
In order to obtain a time series for wages without breaks (other than those already in
Williamson’s national data), a benchmark value for the year 1985 was taken from Williamson’s
second Appendix Table A2.3 (‘International Real Wages, 100 = GB Real Wage in 1975’). The
value from this table for 1985 was divided by the value for the United States, after which the
growth rates of the series for national real wages (as used before) were applied to this benchmark.
This time series is used to calculate the coefficient of variation on a yearly basis, which will be
used as the indicator of convergence here. The coefficient of variation was also calculated for the
times series of GDP per capita in Maddison (1995), which are in 1990 Geary Khamis dollars.
Although the benchmark years for the wage series and the GDP per capita series are thus not
equal, this does not have consequences for the coefficient of variation, because this is a relative,
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 I.e., multiplying the value for our basic indicator (wages of GDP per capita) by a number fixed across5
countries would not change the value of the coefficient of variation. Hence, even though the GDP and wage series
are not measured in similar units, comparing the coefficient of variation between the two is valid.
 In light of the fact that there was a large discrepancy in Table 2 between results based on SNA data and6
results based on Williamson’s data, coefficients of variation were also calculated for the limited time span and
countries for which SNA data are available. These produced results which were rather close to the results for
Williamson’s data, so that one may be relatively confident that the convergence trends found in this Section are
reliable.
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not absolute indicator of convergence.  The fact that the two benchmark years are not too far5
apart (in fact, about as close as the data allows) makes the comparison possible.  6
Figure 2. Convergence in wage levels (thin line) and GDP per capita (thick line) 
(coefficient of variation)
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Figure 2. Convergence in wage levels (thin line) and GDP per capita (thick line) 
(coefficient of variation) (continued)
The results of the yearly calculation of the coefficient of variation are displayed in Figure 2 for
three different samples of countries. A falling line indicates convergence. The first result in the
figures is that the coefficients of variation for wages and GDP per capita are of the same order
of magnitude, as could be expected. The differences between the two lines in each graph are
particularly small for the period before the second World War. 
yˆ
	 lny0,
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For Western Europe, one observes strong convergence for wages in the early years 1870-1890.
This essentially entails a fall of the level of dispersion of wages to that of GDP per capita.
Disparity in GDP per capita remains essentially constant over 1870-1900, after which slow
convergence of both wages and GDP per capita is observed. Convergence for wages stops in the
mid-1920s, while GDP per capita shows a converging trend until 1940. After the second World
War, GDP per capita converges much more rapidly than wages. In fact, the coefficient of
variation for wages remains almost constant over 1950-1970, which is the ‘golden age’ of
convergence in terms of GDP per capita. After 1970, convergence in wages sets in, essentially
until the end of the period. GDP per capita convergence slows down, especially after 1980.
Including the Western Offshoots in the picture gives a rather different result. Before 1940, the
picture differs not so much from the Western European case, although dispersion in wages and
GDP per capita are more similar to each other from the beginning. After 1950, there are large
differences compared to Western Europe alone, however. Strong convergence is observed for
GDP per capita from the end of the war onwards, while convergence of wages sets in around
1960. During 1960-1980, convergence takes place for both wages and GDP per capita, although
the level of dispersion for wages remain quite a bit higher than for GDP per capita.
For the complete Williamson sample (i.e., Western Europe and its Offshoots, Southern Europe,
Argentina and Brazil), the trend is more erratic. During 1870-1910, one observes convergence
of wage levels, but not of GDP per capita. 1910-1950 shows divergence of wage levels, bringing
its coefficient of variation again above the one for GDP per capita (which shows no strong trend).
After 1950, strong convergence for GDP per capita sets in, as in the two previous samples.
Convergence in wages starts only after 1960, but is particularly strong during 1970-1985. From
the mid-1970s onwards, slight divergence in terms of GDP per capita takes place, which implies
that towards the end of the period, the lines for wages and GDP per capita are very close to each
other.
The literature on convergence has made a distinction between so-called -convergence and )-
convergence. The latter is measured trhough the disparity of GDP per capita (or real wages). The
coefficient of variation used so far is an indicator of this type of convergence. Convergence as
predicted by the neo-classical growth model is, however, more accurately measured by so-called
-convergence. This assumes a relationship of the form 
where y is GDP per capita (or real wage), the hat indicates a growth rate, and the subscript zero
indicates an initial value.  and  are parameters which have to be estimated. The above equation
assumes unconditional convergence. If a set of conditioning variables (such as savings rates) are
included in the equation, -convergence does not necessarily imply )-convergence. The latter is
also the case when the error-term which has to be included for estimation purposes has a relatively
large variance. 
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Because -convergence is the more intuitive measure, and because -convergence does not
always lead to )-convergence, the rates of -convergence wre also estimated for the samples and
time periods identified so far. The results of this are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Rates of -convergence for real wages and GDP per capita
Wages GDP per capita Which converges
more rapidly?
(1) All countries  t-stat  t-stat
1870 - 1913 -1.265 3.44 0.118 0.25 wages
1913 - 1950 -1.565 2.44 -0.335 1.43 wages
1950 - 1973 -0.425 0.55 -1.692 2.68 GDP
1973 - 1988 -0.4 0.35 0.337 0.74
(2) Western Europe plus offshoots
1870 - 1913 -1.72 6.21 -0.664 2.14 wages
1913 - 1950 -1.407 0.98 -0.828 1.2 wages
1950 - 1973 -1.907 4.77 -2.938 5.76 GDP
1973 - 1988 -1.494 1.02 -2.548 1.77 GDP
(3) Western Europe
1870 - 1913 -1.522 5.85 -0.508 2.36 wages
1913 - 1950 -1.79 1.27 -1.373 1.68 wages
1950 - 1973 -1.99 3.72 -3.353 5.84 GDP
1973 - 1988 -2.283 3.77 -4.74 3.34 GDP
The results of the tests for -convergence by and large point in the same direction as the )-
convergence indicators used above. In the pre-1913 period, convergence in real wages and GDP
per capita is generally significant. The rate of convergence for wages is higher than for GDP per
capita in all three samples. For the interwar period, convergence is most often not significant.
Only for the sample as a whole in the case of wages do we find a significant . For the period
1950 - 1973, significant -convergence is found for both wages and GDP per capita, but the latter
shows more rapid convergence in all cases. This result is reproduced for the period after 1973,
with the exception of the complete sample. In the latter case, convergence is not significant for
wages or GDP per capita.
Summarizing, there are important differences between convergence trends for wages and GDP
per capita. While one observes strong convergence for GDP per capita in all three samples after
1950, convergence of wage levels is much less strong. Particularly within Western Europe,
convergence of wage levels is almost absent during 1950-1970. Also before the second world
war, there are some differences between convergence of wages and GDP per capita.
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4. Conclusions
This paper has examined and compared the long-run trends in wages and GDP per capita. The
main differences between those two trends emerge in the period after 1950. During 1950-1980,
the gap between the level of wages and GDP per capita (both expressed as their value in 1900 set
to 100) typically becomes larger, with a tendency for some convergence between the two trends
towards the end of the period. In terms of disparity between countries, it is found that the period
after 1950 shows strong convergence of levels of GDP per capita between countries, but less
strong convergence for wages.
Neoclassical growth theory and trade theory (HOS) both generate predictions for the relation
between convergence in wages and convergence in GDP per capita. Growth theory would predict
that both variables converge internationally at approximately the same rate. Trade theory predicts
stronger and more rapid convergence for wages, compared to aggregate GDP per capita (or
rather, labour productivity). Neither of those predictions is substantiated by the findings here, with
the exception for the earliest period (1870 - 1913). In the latter case, the pattern is as predicted
by the trade theory. In other case, either no convergence is found at all, or wages converge at a
slower rate than GDP per capita. Thus, the link between convergence in factor prices and
convergence in GDP per capita is more complex than either one of these two theories
acknowledges. 
More theoretical work on the relation between factor price convergence and convergence in
GDP per capita seems to be necessary to explain the findings in this paper. Such a theory would
undoubtedly benefit from an explicit focus on the interaction between the two variables (such as
in the literature on the link between distribution and growth), and a focus on the institutions of
labour markets. These institutions are highly specific to countries, which provides some idea as
to why the observed relations between wages and GDP per capita differ widely (with regard to
details as well as some of the more general trends) between countries. 
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